The Cold War division of Korea, regarded as a natural experiment in institutional change, provides a unique opportunity to examine whether institutions a¤ect social preferences. We recruited North Korean refugees and South Korean students to conduct laboratory experiments eliciting social preferences, together with standard surveys measuring subjective attitudes toward political and economic institutions. Our experiments employ widely used dictator and trust games, with four possible group matches between North and South Koreans by informing them of the group identity of their anonymous partners. Experimental behavior and support for institutions di¤er substantially between and within groups. North Korean refugees prefer more egalitarian distribution in the dictator games than South Korean students, even after controlling for individual characteristics that could be correlated with social preferences; however, two groups show little di¤erence in the trust game, once we control for more egalitarian behavior of North Koreans. North Korean refugees show less support for market economy and democracy than South Korean subjects. Attitudes toward institutions are more strongly associated with the experimental behaviors among South Korean subjects than among North Korean subjects.
Introduction
Institutions and preferences are central elements in economic analysis in understanding human behavior and economic development. 1 Social scientists have long argued that they interact with each other and co-evolve in the long run, and that it is imperative to …gure out the nature of their interactions. In this paper we seek to answer the following questions:
Are social preferences endogenous to institutions? If so, how do institutions a¤ect social preferences? Despite its signi…cance, empirical research investigating this issue is inherently subject to the problem of identi…cation since preferences are intertwined with institutions.
The citizens of a society select institutions, which in turn de…ne the structure of incentives that constrain the citizens' behavior, and then the citizens may internalize the codes of conduct. De…nite answers to our questions would be di¢ cult to give without an exogenous institutional change.
This paper contributes to the investigation of this issue by exploiting the division of Korea into North and South, following the Second World War, and subsequent institutional changes -a gradual progress to market economy and democracy in South Korea and a socialist economy with communist dictatorship in North Korea -that have occurred up to the present. Korea's partition at the 38th parallel can be viewed as an ongoing natural experiment in institutional change (signi…ed as "the Korean experiment" by Acemoglu et al. (2005) ); the two Koreas were homogeneous prior to the division, the division was made as a result of the Cold War and independent of ordinary Koreans'preferences, and there has been little mobility and communication between the two populations. Therefore, the case of divided Korea o¤ers a unique opportunity for investigating the long-term impacts of institutional changes over time on individual preferences.
Our empirical approach is to utilize two separate pools of individuals who have lived under di¤erent institutions of divided Korea, and to implement with them economic choice experiments eliciting social preferences and standard surveys measuring attitudes toward institutions. Speci…cally, we recruited two distinct groups of North Koreans, along with South Korean subjects. The …rst group consists of those who arrived in South Korea within one and a half years prior to our study. We target this group of newly arrived refugees since they had little opportunity to experience the South Korean society and they are likely to keep social norms they obtained in North Korea. The second group consists of those who have stayed longer in South Korea, are on average younger than the …rst group, and were, at the time of the study, students enrolled in universities in South Korea.
By design, two groups have di¤erent exposures to institutions in North Korea and also to those in South Korea. As a result, we can explore varying lengths of exposures to di¤erent institutional regimes to see how di¤erently North Koreans behave. We recruited South Korean (SK) university students as a counterpart group to North Korean (NK) subjects.
Thus the second group of NK refugees is more comparable to the SK counterpart.
The experiment employs variants of dictator and trust games that have been widely used in the experimental literature in order to measure various dimensions of social preferences:
preferences for giving, trust, and trustworthiness. Speci…cally, we conducted the following three experiments: (i) the other-other dictator game in which endowment is divided between two anonymous opponents; (ii) the self-other dictator game where endowment is divided between the subject and an anonymous opponent (based on Andreoni and Miller (2002) ); and (iii) the trust game (based on Berg et al. (1995) ) where the receiver has a chance to return a part of money received from the sender. One important feature of our design is that subjects are informed of the group identity of their partners as NK refugees or SK students. Each subject played the games sequentially against anonymous partners from either the NK or SK groups. This design enables us to measure each dimension of social preferences directed toward in-group and out-group members.
We supplemented our experimental measurement with a large number of survey questions and collected rich information about individual characteristics. The variables common to both Koreans include standard demographic information such as age and gender, and subjective assessments on a variety of socioeconomic a¤airs. Among them, we are particularly interested in eliciting attitudes toward market economy and democracy. Questions about market economy entail personal attitudes toward private ownership (vs. state ownership), competition, and performance-based incentives. As for democracy, we asked subjects about their attitudes toward a multi-party political system, freedom of voting, and individualism (vs. collectivism).
If we …nd any di¤erences between SK and NK subjects in our experimental measures of social preferences and if such di¤erences remain signi…cant even after controlling for a variety of individual characteristics, it would lend credence to the idea that the experience of living under socialism itself (mainly characterized by central planning and political dictatorship) induces North Korean refugees to have social preferences substantially di¤erent from those of South Koreans. In addition, if the heterogeneity of social preferences is related to attitudes toward institutions, it would further support our view that institutions a¤ect preferences of two Koreans. Undoubtedly, North Korean refugees are a selected sample of the North Korean population and have been exposed to South Korean institutions. Despite this legitimate concern, the study with NK refugees may well be justi…ed to investigate the e¤ects of institutions on preferences because it is practically impossible to recruit subjects among those who live currently in North Korea and also the refugeees are likely to be a sample of North Koreans with the most a¤ection to the South Korean society. Therefore, any di¤erence that we …nd in our paper is likely to be a lower bound for the di¤erence between two Koreas. Obviously the two groups of subjects should di¤er in many other regards. Thus, we analyzed experimental results by regressing them on group matching dummies along with a set of various individual characteristics and attitudinal variables.
Our main …ndings are as follows. First, with regard to giving in the dictator game, North Koreans are more egalitarian than South Koreans, irrespective of the group identity of their partner. When we look closely at individual-level behavior, the majority of North
Koreans prefer the equal division of money between self and the partner whereas a substantial number of South Koreans are sel…sh. To highlight the order of the magnitude in di¤erences between North and South, we point out that only 4% of North Koreans gave zero to their anonymous North Korean counterparts, whereas 30% of South Koreans gave zero to their South Korean opponents. 2 North Koreans are signi…cantly more generous relative to the baseline case of South Koreans playing against South Korean partners, even after controlling for individual characteristics as well as experimental controls. 3 The behavior of South Korean students is quantitatively consistent with the …ndings in the literature for university students in the United States (e.g., Andreoni and Miller (2002) ).
In addition, we …nd that the amount of giving is negatively associated with support for market economy but not with support for democracy. The negative association between preferences for giving and attitudes toward market economy is statistically signi…cant and stronger for South Koreans than for North Koreans.
Second, in the trust game, North Koreans gave more to their partners than South Koreans in both the amount transferred by the …rst mover and the amount returned by the second mover. However, after controlling for individual characteristics and the share of money sent in the dictator game (following Cox (2004)), there is no signi…cant di¤erence between South and North Koreans about the experimental measures of trust and reciprocity. The trust measure is negatively correlated with support for market economy and positively associated with support for democracy among South Korean subjects. These associations are much weaker for North Korean subjects. Finally, there is no signi…cant relation between reciprocity and attitudes toward institutions.
Third, two di¤erent North Korean groups behaved similarly, although they di¤er substantially by age, education, income prospects, varying exposures to di¤erent institutions, and so on. This is consistent with the idea that social preferences are persistent and deeply rooted by institutions. 4 We contribute to three distinct branches of the literature. First, our paper is directly re- than West Germans about a decade after the German reuni…cation. Our paper advances these studies with the experimental method eliciting social preferences, in addition to the traditional survey method.
Second, more generally, our study adds new evidence to the literature investigating the interaction between institutions and preferences. Tabellini (2008) (Gneezy et al., 2012) . Along with this branch of the literature, our paper adds novel evidence on the overall impact of institutional regimes on individuals'social preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the perspective on the division of Korea as a natural experiment in institutional changes. Section 3 describes the design and procedures of the experiment and the survey. Section 4 describes the experimental data and presents the results from regressing experimental measures of social preferences on attitudinal support for market economy and democracy. We conclude in Section 5. This paper also uses Online Appendices to provide the English-translated version of documents used in the experiment and survey, summary information speci…c to North Korean refugees, and other technical details. News stories in o¢ cial radio and television broadcasts obviously re ‡ect o¢ cial government positions and propaganda in North Korea. 6 South Koreans are also not permitted to listen 6 North Korea is probably the most repressive regime in the world, with the tight information barrier between its own people and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, that information barrier may be eroding. Lee (2006) and Haggard and Noland (2011) enrolled in a university (most of them from Sogang University; some from other neighboring dishes. However, they conclude these cases appear atypical. universities). In recruiting NK refugees, we relied initially on personal contacts by some key members of the community of NK refugees. After initial contacts, we sent out invitation letters on university letterhead to NK refugees to ensure the credibility of our research and to encourage their voluntary participation in the study. For the group of SK subjects, we recruited undergraduate students at SNU and Sogang University by sending out mass invitation emails through the university IT system, inviting those who were born in South Korea to take part in the experiment. The total number of NK subjects is 205 (133 in and (iii) post-experiment survey. Upon arrival of all subjects in a university lecture room, each session started with subjects being asked to read and sign the consent form of the experiment if they wished to participate in the experiment. Once the consent form had been collected, each subject was asked to randomly draw from a box an ID card, on which his or her unique ID number was written. It was emphasized and reiterated throughout the session that subjects should use their unique ID numbers on the registration form, decision sheets in the experiment, and survey questionnaires.
In Study 1, after the random assignment of IDs, NK subjects in each session were randomly divided into three groups. Each group was guided by experiment assistants into another lecture room for registration and priming. Upon arriving in each room, subjects received a registration form asking some con…dential information such as contact address and bank account for payments from the experiment. When registration was completed, subjects were invited to answer a short questionnaire about some historic events between South Korea and North Korea. They were informed that their answers were irrelevant to their earnings in the experiment. One group received a set of three questions related behavior. For SK subjects in Study 1 and for both NK and SK subjects in Study 2, one session consisted of a single priming treatment. 7 After registration and priming on interKorean historical events, all subjects gathered in a large lecture room for the experiment and survey. Subjects were seated with enough distance between them in Study 1 and within cubicles in Study 2 to ensure that there was no communication among them during the experiment and survey. Table 1 gives information on subjects'basic demographics and priming treatments.
- Table 1 here -
The experiment employs three games in sequence: (i) the other-other dictator game;
(ii) the self-other dictator game; and (iii) the trust game. Subjects were informed that the group matching for playing each game would be done about two weeks after the experiment with all participants. They were then invited to make separate decisions in each distinct case of matching, using separate decision tables or sheets. The only information about their opponents that was provided to subjects in Study 1 was either that the opponent is an anonymous NK refugee who entered South Korea in 2010 or 2011 or that the opponent is an anonymous SK student who was born in South Korea and is currently enrolled in a university in Seoul. In Study 2, subjects were only told either that the opponent is an anonymous NK refugee who is currently enrolled in a university in Seoul or that the opponent is an anonymous SK student who was born in South Korea and is currently enrolled in a university in Seoul. We will illustrate the details of the games below. Payments in the experiment were the sum of earnings in each of three games. NK subjects, on average, obtained around 26,000 KRW in both studies. SK subjects, on average, earned 24,000 KRW in Study 1 and 23,000 KRW in Study 2. In addition, as a participation fee, NK subjects received 50,000 KRW in Study 1 and 30,000 KRW in Study 2, and SK subjects 10,000 KRW in both studies. 89 Approximately, two weeks after the completion of the study, we transferred payments to the bank accounts for which subjects had given us the details. The subjects were informed of this payment schedule at the very beginning of the experiment. 10 After the completion of the experiment, subjects were asked to …ll out post-experiment survey questions. The experiment and survey lasted approximately three (two) hours for NK subjects in Study 1 (Study 2) and about one-and-a-half hours for SK subjects in both studies. 11 
Experimental games
We now describe three games used in the experimental design.
Other-other dictator game In the …rst experimental task, each subject was asked to allocate 10,000 KRW between two other anonymous participants randomly selected from the entire pool of participants in each study. It was noted that it was not possible to allocate money to him/herself. Given the possibility that each 'other'can be selected from NK or SK subjects, each subject was asked to make a decision for each of three possible matchings: (i) NK vs. NK; (ii) NK vs. SK; and (iii) SK vs. SK. In order to facilitate subjects'decisions, we discretized the set of choices into multiples of 10% of the initial endowment to be divided between two other participants. The choice problem was presented in a decision table and subjects were asked to tick one column using a pencil. 12 We adopt this other-other allocation task or dictator game for two purposes. First, the social psychology literature (e.g., Turner (1978) ) …nds that the other-other allocation task, if followed by a self-other allocation task, can help enhance the sense of group identity (see also Chen and Li (2009) ). Second, the complexity of game tasks increases in the sequence of three games. By presenting a simpler game …rst, we intended to help subjects comprehend the games that followed more easily.
It was publicly announced that each subject's decisions would be used to determine the actual earnings of two other participants and, likewise, that each subject's earnings in this part were determined by decisions made by the other participants in the same study.
Self-other dictator game In the second game, each subject was asked to allocate an endowment between him/herself (self ) and one other participant (other) randomly selected from the pool of participants in each study. We use this game to measure individual preferences for giving and separate them from trust and trustworthiness or reciprocity in the subsequent trust game. For this, we adopted the modi…ed dictator game used by Andreoni and Miller (2002) . 13 In this game, subjects were presented with a series of budget sets with varying amounts of initial endowment m and prices for payo¤s between self and other, respectively p s and p o , satisfying the condition
where p denotes the relative price of giving, p o =p s . The money allocation between self, denoted by s , and other, denoted by o , should satisfy this budget condition. In the experiment, we used eight di¤erent budget sets as shown below:
m t (KRW) 10; 000 15; 000 15; 000 18; 000 25; 000 30; 000 30; 000 36; 000
This design creates rich variations in relative prices and incomes. It allows us to measure preferences for giving at the level of individual subjects.
In order to help subjects make a choice, we present them with a discrete set of possible choices from each budget set as multiples of 10% transfer of an endowment m. Thus, each subject was able to choose n t in the form of money transfer to other in budget set t = 1; :::; 8, n t 0:1 m t , for n t = 0; 1; 2; :::; 10. Subjects were presented with corresponding tables to mark their decisions against each of NK and SK opponents (see Online Appendix I for detail about decision sheets). Earnings in the self-other dictator game were determined in the following way. We randomly formed groups of two subjects. One subject in each group was randomly selected as a decision-maker or dictator. We randomly selected one out of the eight budget sets of the selected decision-maker, corresponding to the identity of the opponent (i.e., against an NK or an SK opponent). Earnings were then determined by the decision in the selected budget set.
Trust game The last game is to measure trust and trustworthiness or reciprocity.
We adopted a variant of the trust game used by Berg et al. (1995) in which the …rst mover allocated an initial endowment of money, 10,000 KRW, between him/herself and the receiver, the second mover. The amount transferred was tripled and the second mover then decided how much of this tripled amount to return to the …rst mover. By combining the behaviors in the self-other dictator game and the trust game, we can separately identify trust and reciprocity from preferences for giving in the spirit of Cox (2004) . Note that the …rst budget set in the self-other dictator game is equivalent to the decision problem of the …rst mover in the trust game, except that the second mover has a decision to make in the trust game. Thus, we shall use the giving behavior in the …rst budget set of the self-other dictator game as a control in measuring trust. We again discretized the set of possible money transfer by the …rst mover as multiples of 10% transfer of the endowment 10,000
KRW.
In our experiment, subjects played both roles, i.e., the …rst mover and the second mover.
We used the strategy method by asking the second mover how much he or she was willing to return for each possible amount received. When nothing was transferred by the …rst mover, there was no decision for the second mover to make. For any positive amount of money transfer (there are 10 possible amounts of money transfer), the second mover was asked to state the amount of money he or she wanted to return. In each role (…rst mover and second mover), each subject was asked to make decisions for each possible matching, either an NK or an SK opponent.
The earnings in the trust game were determined as follows. We randomly formed groups of two subjects. One in each group was randomly selected as the …rst mover and the other as the second mover. Having assigned the roles, we matched their corresponding decision 14 sheets and determined the earnings of both subjects.
Survey
After the experiments, we conducted a survey to collect information of individual subjects.
The common set of questions to NK and SK subjects included demographic information as well as a variety of attitudinal responses such as attitudes toward market economy and democracy, national identity, and trust and trustworthiness attitudes from the General Social Survey (GSS). In addition, NK subjects were asked to …ll out questions about political and economic activities in North Korea, experiences of escaping from North Korea prior to entry to South Korea, and the resettlement and assimilation process in South Korea. 14 We are particularly interested in …nding whether attitudes toward economic and political institutions explain the di¤erences between NK and SK subjects we …nd from our experiments. To answer the question, we hypothesize that institutional di¤erences between NK and SK are mainly characterized by market economy, regarding economic institutions, and democracy, regarding political institutions, and asked a set of survey questions asking perceptions about market economy and democracy. Attitudinal variable for democracy aggregates the degree of support for (i) a multi-party political system, (ii) freedom of voting, and (iii) individualism (vs. collectivism). Speci…cally, for a multi-party system, we asked the degree of support for the following sentence: "Multiple political parties are necessary to aggregate diverse opinions." On freedom of voting, the following two sentences were presented: "A nation's leader should be selected among multiple candidates by people's free will" and "I make my own voting decision rather than following others'opinions." As for individualism, "One's liberty can be sacri…ced for the bene…t of the whole"was presented.
Analogously, we constructed attitudinal variable for market economy by aggregating responses to (i) private ownership (vs. state ownership), (ii) competition, and (iii)
performance-based incentives. For private ownership, the following sentence was presented:
"It is better for the state rather than individuals to own …rms, lands, residences, etc."With regard to competition, we presented subjects with "Competition among individuals is necessary for economic development"and "It is more convenient to live in a collectivist society without competition."Finally, on performance-based incentives, "One should get paid higher 14 Online Appendix II provides summary statistics of variables that are speci…c to North Korean subjects.
than another, if the former works better than the latter, even though they are of the same age and same rank in the same company"was presented.
These measurements on attitudes toward institutions are subjective but can be quite informative in our case. According to the World Values Surveys conducted in [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] (that is, the period immediately after the collapse of socialism), residents living in former socialist countries in Eastern Europe appear to prefer stronger government responsibility and less private ownership compared with those living in market economies. 15 In addition, In addition to attitudes toward institutions, because NK and SK subjects are likely to di¤er in many other regards, we collected information on perception of national identity, attitudes toward NK refugees, trust and trustworthiness attitudes (using questions taken from the General Social Survey), etc. Subjects were asked to report the degree of their support for each of these questions using a …ve-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The full detail of attitudinal questions is given in Online Appendix I. In our regression analysis, we will control for a variety of individual characteristics.
We summarize the attitudinal responses of NK and SK subjects in Table 2 . When constructing each attitudinal variable in Table 2 , we sum a subject's responses to questions, re-ordering them when necessary so that higher scores re ‡ect greater support for that variable. We then normalize the score to generate an attitudinal measure with sample mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The number in parentheses in the …rst two columns is a within-group standard error, after the normalization.
- Table 2 here -There are notable di¤erences in most attitudinal responses between the two groups. 16 Above all, NK subjects are in far less support of democracy and market economy than SK subjects. By looking at each component in the attitudinal questions about market economy and democracy, we …nd that NK subjects show less support for democracy mainly because they show less support for a multi-party system and individualism. There is little di¤erence between NK and SK subjects in the support for voting freedom. 17 On the other hand, NK subjects show less support for each component of market economy. Betweengroup di¤erences are also shown for other attitudinal responses. NK subjects show stronger national identity as Korean and as South Korean, and more positive attitudes toward South
Korean society. NK subjects show more compassion toward fellow NK refugees than SK subjects do. There are also between-group variations in attitudinal measures of trust, trustworthiness, being fair, and being helped. NK subjects appear to be more risk averse.
For most attitudinal scores, we observe little di¤erence in standard errors between NK and SK groups, suggesting that attitudinal responses within group are equally heterogeneous between the two groups.
Results
We begin our analysis by describing the experimental data in order to check whether there are any between-group di¤erences in subjects'behavior in the experimental games. The experimental results will quantify the extents to which institutional di¤erences between North and South Korea may impact individual behavior and preferences. We will then move on to the regression analysis to check whether any group di¤erences remain robust after controlling for individual characteristics and experimental controls and to examine the association between experimental measures of social preferences and attitudinal support for market economy and democracy.
Description of experimental data 4.1.1 Preferences for giving
We …rst examine the e¤ects of group identity on other-other allocation. In the other-other dictator game, the decision-maker does not receive any direct material compensation from his or her own decision. We intend to see whether there is any in-group or out-group favoritism when subjects'choices have no direct consequence on their own payo¤s. Table   3 presents a summary of the percentage of money allocated to the …rst other opponent in each matching case in the other-other dictator game -NK vs. NK, SK vs. SK, and NK vs. SK. 18 In the asymmetric matching case of NK vs. SK, the …rst other opponent is an anonymous NK subject. We report the frequencies of allocation decisions to one of three situations: (i) equal division (= 50%); (ii) favoritism to the …rst other opponent (> 50%);
and (iii) favoritism to the second other opponent (< 50%). In addition, we report the p-value for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare the distributions of money allocation by the NK and the SK group in each matching case.
- Table 3 hereAs evident in Table 3 , the equal division of the money is the behavioral norm in the symmetric matching cases for both groups. Across studies and symmetric matching cases, the vast majority (around or more than 75%) of subjects allocated equally between two anonymous others. The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests suggest that for each symmetric matching case, the distributions of allocation by the NK and the SK group are not statistically di¤erent at the 5% signi…cance level. On the other hand, the tendency for equal allocation becomes much weaker in the asymmetric matching case, NK vs. SK: only 29% (Study 1) and 45% (Study 2) of the SK subjects chose the equal division between an anonymous NK other and an anonymous SK other, while 53% (Study 1) and 67% (Study 2) of the NK subjects selected the equal split. A more striking feature is that both NK and SK groups appear to exhibit favoritism toward an anonymous NK opponent rather than an SK opponent. The extent of that favoritism seems stronger in the NK group than in the SK group. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of allocation by the NK and the SK group are equivalent (p-values are 0:910 in Study 1 and 0:186 in Study 2). Thus, we conclude that there are no group di¤erences in the other-other dictator game.
We next turn to behavior in the self-other dictator game. Unlike in the other-other allocation, subjects in this game choose the division of money between him/herself and an anonymous other opponent. Thus, subjects'behavior in this game reveals their preferences for giving or their degree of generosity. We de…ne the fraction of money given to other Table 4 reports the mean fractions of money given to other across budget sets and opponent groups, along with t-statistics for pairwise mean di¤erences.
- Table 4 hereThere are several notable patterns in the subjects'behavior that are informative about the preferences for giving to NK and SK members. First of all, NK subjects, on average, give signi…cantly more to each opponent group than SK subjects do. The pairwise t-statistics between NK and SK subjects against each opponent group are reported in columns, (1) - (3) and (2) - (4). Second, SK subjects allocate signi…cantly more to other in each budget set when their opponents are NK subjects than when they are SK subjects (see column (3) -(4) for t-statistics). This tendency becomes weaker for the NK subjects and is not signi…cant in six out of the eight budget sets (see column (1) -(2) for t-statistics).
This may suggest that SK subjects sympathize with the NK group. On the other hand, NK subjects treat NK and SK opponents equally. This may suggest that NK subjects have strong aversion to disparate treatments between groups. Third, the mean fraction given is quite responsive to the relative price of giving for both NK and SK subjects. When the relative price increases (that is, the cost of giving increases), the percentage of money given to other decreases. This suggests overall that our subjects respond sensitively to the change of incentives in the experiment. We highlight the results of the self-other dictator game by presenting graphically the relationship between mean fractions and relative prices of giving for both groups of subjects against each opponent group in Figure 1 .
19 19 One competing hypothesis about the di¤erence between NK and SK behavior is that it is a mere re ‡ection of an income or wealth e¤ect. For this reason, we recruited NK refugees who are enrolled in a university in Study 2. They are more comparable to SK university students in this regard. We …nd basically no di¤erence in the behavior of NK subjects between Study 1 and Study 2. This seems to suggest that the income or wealth e¤ect is at least not a main driver of the behavioral di¤erence in our data. Furthermore, we are not aware of any empirical evidence that wealth is negatively related to generosity.
- Figure 1 who cannot be classi…ed without noise, we minimize the Euclidean distance between the observed behavior and the behavior predicted by each preference type and select the one giving the minimum distance. We call this a 'weak'type. The results are reported in Table   5 .
- Table 5 hereThe majority of NK subjects follow the Leontief preference type: 70% (54%) against NK opponents and 68% (56%) against SK opponents in Study 1 (Study 2, respectively), averaging out to 64% against NK opponents and 63% against SK opponents in all samples.
The frequencies of preference types do not di¤er across the group identity of opponents.
On the other hand, the major preference type for SK subjects is the sel…sh one: 43% (45%) against NK opponents and 58% (56%) against SK opponents in Study 1 (Study 2, respectively), averaging out to 43% against NK opponents and 57% against SK opponents in all samples. We observe a higher frequency of the sel…sh type when SK subjects face SK opponents than when they face NK opponents. It is also notable that some NK subjects are 20 Subjects' behavior in the self-other dictator game shows high compliance to the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) for utility maximization hypothesis. We measure the extent of GARP violations, using Afriat's (1972) Critical Cost E¢ ciency Index (CCEI). The CCEI is de…ned to be between zero and one; the closer the CCEI is to one, the closer the data are to satisfying GARP. The average CCEI scores for SK subjects are 0.998 in both cases against NK and SK opponents. For NK subjects, the average CCEI scores are 0.970 when facing NK opponents and 0.973 when playing against SK opponents. Varian (1991) suggests a threshold of 0.95 for determining whether individual behavior is close enough to satisfying GARP. 20 altruistic while virtually none of SK subjects are so. Overall, the distributions of preference types con…rm the aggregate behavior of NK and SK subjects.
A couple of remarks are in order before we move to behavior in the trust game. First, we point out that the behavior of the SK subjects is largely consistent with the …ndings in the literature with university students in the US. Andreoni and Miller (2002) reported that their subjects gave away around 23% of the endowment when the relative price of giving was 1. Fisman et al. (2005), using more variations of relative price, reported that their subjects gave about 19% of money to other over all prices. Forsythe et al. (1994) found similar evidence on giving behavior. In our experimental data, when the relative price of giving was 1, the SK subjects gave around 21% and 19% of the endowment to their fellow SK subjects in Study 1 and Study 2, respectively. Over all prices, our SK subjects gave around 21% of money to their in-group members in both studies. Second, in the individual-level analysis, Andreoni and Miller (2002) reported that the majority of their subjects (around 47%) behaved closest to the sel…sh preference type. Therefore, we conclude that the behavior of SK subjects against SK opponents in our experiment is consistent with the …ndings in the literature. We take the case of SK against SK as a baseline case in the subsequent regression analysis. Table 6 summarizes the behaviors of the …rst mover and the second mover in the trust game. Panel A reports the average fraction transferred (relative to the endowment) by the …rst mover across studies and groups. We also report values of t-statistics comparing sample means between when NK is an opponent and when SK is an opponent. First, the average fractions of money transferred are quite high, ranging between 0.25 and 0.43. It appears that the NK group transfers more than the SK group in each study. When we look at the within-study, within-group di¤erence between NK opponent and SK opponent, the NK subjects transferred the same amount regardless the identity of opponents. However, the SK subjects transferred signi…cantly more to NK opponents than to SK opponents.
Trust and reciprocity
- Table 6 herePanel B of Table 6 presents the average fraction of money returned (relative to the money available) by the second mover. Again we report t-test results from comparing means between when the opponent is NK and when the opponent is SK. First, with regard to the average fraction of money returned, we …nd similar patterns of behavior to those in the dictator game: the NK subjects return more than the SK subjects and the NK subjects do not discriminate between NK and SK opponents, whereas the SK subjects return more when they face NK opponents than when they face SK opponents. (2005)) typically refers to the amount sent by the …rst mover as a measure of trust and to the amount returned by the second mover as a measure of trustworthiness or reciprocity. However, the amounts sent and returned in the trust game are likely driven also by preferences for giving which are evidenced in the self-other dictator game. Hence, it is more plausible to di¤erentiate trust and reciprocity from preferences for giving and measure them separately. In the regression analysis in Section 4.2, we shall control for preferences for giving in comparing trust behavior across and within groups, in the spirit of Cox (2004) and Sapienza et al. (2007) . To this end, we highlight again that the decision problem in the …rst budget set of the self-other dictator game is the same as the …rst mover's problem in the trust game, except that the second mover will make a decision in response to the …rst mover's decision. We shall use the fraction of money given in this problem of the self-other dictator game as a control for preferences for giving. The self-other dictator game has m s m 0 = 15; 000 and 25; 000 when the relative price of giving is 1. Among the situations faced by the receiver in the trust game, the closest to m s m 0 = 15; 000 and 25; 000 (within 10; 000) are (m s ; m o ) = (18; 000; 4; 000) and (27; 000; 1; 000), respectively. For the purpose of controlling for preferences for giving in measuring reciprocity, we shall utilize only these two decision situations of the second mover in the trust game in our later regression analysis.
Regression results
The main interests in our regression analysis lie in (i) examining whether the between-group di¤erences in experimental behavior remain robust after controlling for a variety of potentially confounding factors and (ii) exploring the relationships between social preferences and attitudinal support for market economy and democracy. In the regression analysis, we employ three matching dummies to facilitate between-group comparisons: NK denotes a dummy variable indicating whether a decision-maker (e.g., self in the self-other dictator game) is an NK subject; NKr represents a dummy indicating whether a recipient (e.g., other in the self-other dictator game) is an NK opponent; and NK NKr denotes a dummy indicating that an NK subject faces an NK opponent. The baseline case of matching is thus the case where an SK subject plays against an SK opponent. 21 Table 7 presents the regression results about giving behavior in the self-other dictator game. 22 Each individual subject made 16 decisions over two di¤erent opponent groups (eight decisions for each of NK and SK opponent groups). We use the fraction of money given to other, o = ( s + o ), as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parentheses.
Preferences for giving
- Table 7 here - 21 The data contain four possible pairs. They match to the following combinations of the dummy variables: (i) N K = 0; N Kr = 0; and N K N Kr = 0 when an SK subject plays against an SK opponent; (ii) N K = 0; N Kr = 1; and N K N Kr = 0 when SK against NK; (iii) N K = 1; N Kr = 0; and N K N Kr = 0 when NK against SK; and (iv) N K = 1; N Kr = 1; and N K N Kr = 1 when NK against NK. 22 Online Appendix IV contains the full description of regression results in this section.
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The simplest speci…cation (column 1) uses only demographic variables (gender, four categories of age, and their interactions with the NK dummy) and experimental controls (the matching dummies, priming treatments, the natural logarithm of amounts of endowment, the relative price of giving, a dummy for Study 1, and the number of each session's participants). We …rst note that priming on inter-Korean historical events has no e¤ects on giving behavior. This might be in part because our priming treatments are not strong enough to stimulate subjects or in part because their existing notion about the NK-SK relationship is too …rm to manipulate.
The coe¢ cients on the matching dummies con…rm the di¤erences in giving behavior across groups established in the previous section. Compared with the baseline case of SK against SK, NK subjects give 19 percentage points more to SK opponents, SK subjects give around 8 percentage points more to NK opponents, and NK subjects give 20 percentage points more to NK opponents.
Column 2 reports the correlation between giving behavior and attitudinal support for market economy and democracy, controlling only for the demographic information and the experimental controls. We …nd that attitudinal support for market economy is negatively correlated with giving behavior, while there is no signi…cant relation between attitudes toward democracy and giving behavior: a standard deviation increase in attitudinal score for market economy is associated with a decrease of 3 percentage points in giving behavior. This is statistically signi…cant at the 1% signi…cance level. We also …nd that the coe¢ cient on the NK matching dummy decreases a bit: NK subjects give 16 percentage points more to SK subjects relative to the case of SK against SK. Other coe¢ cients on the matching dummies change little.
In column 3, we add to the list of controls other attitudinal variables such as national identities, attitudes toward NK refugees, and trust/trustworthiness attitudes. First, the coe¢ cient on the NK matching dummy drops substantially, meaning that NK subjects give only around 9 percentage points more to SK opponents than SK subjects do. There is little change in the other coe¢ cients of matching dummies. Second, the association between the attitudinal score for market economy and giving behavior is robust to the addition of other and attitudinal support for market economy is robust to all these controls. 23 The di¤er-ence in giving behavior reduces to around 9 percentage points between NK and SK subjects facing SK opponents but remains signi…cant.
The group di¤erences in giving behavior and their associations with attitudinal support for institutions are graphically presented in Figure 2 . For this purpose, we take the regression results in column 6 with the full set of controls to predict giving behavior. We normalize this predicted value to be zero for the baseline case of SK against SK with its corresponding attitudinal score for market economy or democracy being zero. Table 7 , for all matching cases, average giving behavior does not respond sensitively to the change in attitudinal support for democracy.
- Figure 2 here - Table 8 reports the regression analysis of trust behavior (the behavior of the …rst mover in the trust game) on the set of controls. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parentheses.
Trust and reciprocity
- Table 8 hereColumn 1 presents the baseline result by controlling for the demographic information and the experimental controls including the matching dummies. In addition, as discussed in the previous section, the fraction of money (relative to the amount of endowment) given in the self-other dictator game is added for the control of preferences for giving. We …rst …nd strong evidence that the …rst mover's behavior is signi…cantly driven by preferences for giving, con…rming Cox (2004) . Controlling for this, there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the experimental measure of trust between NK and SK subjects against SK opponents (0.1% di¤erence). NK subjects transfer around 0.8 percentage point less to NK opponents relative to the baseline case of SK against SK. SK subjects transfer 3.4 percentage points more money to NK opponents than to SK opponents. This is statistically signi…cant at the 10% signi…cance level. We …nd that priming on inter-Korean historical events does not a¤ect subjects in the trust game.
Column 2 adds the attitudinal score for market economy and democracy, in addition to the baseline controls used in the …rst speci…cation. Column 3 further adds other attitudinal variables. There is little change in the coe¢ cients on the matching dummies. Interestingly, the trust measure is negatively correlated with attitudinal support for market economy and . This is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level of signi…cance. We …nd much weaker and insigni…cant associations between them for NK subjects. 24 Column 6 reports the regression result with the full set of controls including the interactions of other attitudinal scores with matching dummies. With all the controls, there is no signi…cant di¤erence in trust across groups. Intriguingly, we …nd that the relation between trust and attitudinal support for market economy and democracy is robust to the controls we use. For the sake of illustration, we graphically present the predicted value of trust in each matching case, conditional on the attitudinal score of interest being 1 or 1, in Figure 3 . We again normalize this predicted value to be zero for the baseline case of SK against SK with its corresponding attitudinal score for market economy or democracy being zero. Both panels clearly show that the average predicted values of trust are no di¤erent across all matching cases and that the association between the trust measure and the attitudinal score for market economy or democracy is strong for SK subjects but not for NK subjects.
- Figure 3 hereWe next turn to the analysis of reciprocity using the behavior of the second mover in the trust game. Table 9 presents the regression results of the money fraction returned on various controls. As we discussed earlier, we use two decisions by the second mover, where the amount of money available is either 18,000 or 27,000 KRW, and match corresponding similar decisions in the self-other dictator game to control for preferences for giving. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parentheses.
- Table 9 here -
The baseline result reported in column 1 is obtained by controlling for the demographic information and the experimental controls, as well as the money fractions in the decisions of the self-other dictator game as a control for preferences for giving. We also add an indicator for the second mover having 27,000 KRW available. Similar to the trust behavior, the second mover's behavior is signi…cantly related to their giving behavior in the dictator game. After controlling for preferences for giving, we …nd no di¤erence in the reciprocity measure across groups. With regard to priming e¤ects, subjects in the priming treatment of peace-making appear to have lower reciprocity than those in the control treatment with no priming, in some speci…cations. However, the results are not robust across di¤erent speci…cations.
We follow the same steps of controlling for extra survey information as in the analysis of giving and trust behavior. We …nd no signi…cant e¤ects of matching dummies across di¤erent speci…cations, suggesting that there is no group di¤erence in reciprocity. Also, the relation between reciprocity and attitudinal support for market economy and democracy is quite weak and not signi…cant in most cases. Relative to the baseline matching case of SK against SK, there is some association between reciprocity and attitudinal support for democracy when SK subjects face NK opponents. It is signi…cant at the 10% signi…cance level but the magnitude is small. Therefore, we conclude that the experimental measure of reciprocity is no di¤erent between NK and SK subjects and has little associations with attitudinal support for market economy and democracy.
Conclusion
We have examined whether institutions a¤ect social preferences by exploiting the division of Korea as a natural experiment of institutional change. Using North Korean refugees and South Korean students, we have provided new evidence on the e¤ects of institutions on social preferences. We employed widely-used experiments to elicit social preferences and standard surveys to measure various aspects of individual characteristics as well as subjective attitudes toward economic and political institutions. The two Koreas are di¤erent in many institutional details. We have focused on market economy, as a key di¤erence in economic institutions, and democracy, as a key di¤erence in political institutions.
North Korean subjects exhibit more egalitarian behavior in the dictator game, compared with South Korean subjects in our sample. Even after controlling for a rich set of confounding factors, we …nd that the inter-Korean di¤erences in preferences for giving remain robust. However there is no signi…cant group di¤erence in trust or reciprocity, after controlling for preferences for giving. NK subjects exhibit signi…cantly less support for market economy and democracy. Preferences for giving and trust are negatively associated with attitudinal support for market economy. That is, those who are in more favor of market economy are more likely to be self-regarding and less likely to trust an anonymous person. Trust is positively correlated with support for democracy. Those who are in more favor of democracy are more likely to trust an anonymous person. These associations are strong and signi…cant among South Korean subjects but rather weak and often insigni…-cant among North Korean subjects. It is beyond the scope of this paper but an interesting topic for further research to explain why subjective attitudes toward market economy and democracy did not translate into the behavior in the experiments for North Koreans.
The adaption of North Korean refugees in South Korea presents a signi…cant challenge.
They often lack the education and skills that are useful in searching for a job. Our study supports the view that, in addition to lack of appropriate skills, they arrive with di¤erent social norms and preferences. Are these di¤erences important for the process of assimilation into the South Korean society? Do social preferences change over time and, if so, how do they change? Understanding the evolution of social preferences is an important avenue for future research. Note. The predicted value of giving is based on the regression of giving behavior on the full set of controls reported in column (6) of Table 7 . It is normalized to the value for the case of SK against SK with its corresponding attitudinal score for market economy or democracy being zero. Note. The predicted value of trust behavior is based on the regression of trust behavior on the full set of controls reported in column (6) of Table  8 . It is normalized to the value for the case of SK against SK with its corresponding attitudinal score for market economy or democracy being zero. Notes. In classifying weak types, we minimize the Euclidean distance between the observed behavior and the behavior predicted by each preference type. An NK subject whose behavior against an NK opponent is minimized by types of Leontief and perfect substitute. The type assignement of that subject is equally distributed between these two types.
C. Study 2 NK subjects SK subjects against NK against SK against NK against SK Table 7 . Regression analysis of giving behavior in the self-other dictator game Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. NK is an indicator of NK subject being a decision-maker, while NKr is an indicator of NK subject being a recipient. Demographic controls include gender, four categories of age, and their interactions with the NK dummy. Other experimental controls contain the natural logarithms of amount of endowment and relative price of giving, a dummy for Study 1, and the size of session. Other attitudinal controls include national identity, attitudes toward NK refugees, trust/trustworthiness attitudes (GSS), and survey responses on risk taking and experience of being discriminated against. They are also interacted with NK , NKr , and NK × NKr dummies. Table 8 . Regression analysis of trust behavior: the first mover in the trust game Notes. Robust standard errors, clusterd by individual subject, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. NK is an indicator of NK subject being a decision-maker, while NKr is an indicator of NK subject being a receipient. Demographic controls include gender, four categories of age, and their interactions with the NK dummy.
Other experimental controls contain a dummy for Study 1 and the size of session. Other attitudinal controls include national identity, attitudes toward NK refugees, trust/trustworthiness attitudes (GSS), and survey responses on risk taking and experience of being discriminated against. They are also interacted with NK , NKr , and NK × NKr dummies. Table 9 . Regression analysis of reciprocity behavior: the second mover in the trust game Notes. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual subject, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. NK is an indicator of NK subject being a decision-maker, while NKr is an indicator of NK subject being a recipient. Demographic controls include gender, four categories of age, and their interactions with the NK dummy. Other experimental controls contain a dummy for Study 1 and the size of session. Other attitudinal controls include national identity, attitudes toward NK refugees, trust/trustworthiness attitudes (GSS), and survey responses on risk taking and experience of being discriminated against. They are also interacted with NK , NKr , and NK × NKr dummies.
